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The Logic and Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ as China’s 
Grand Strategy 
 
Barry Buzan 
 
[Note: This article has been accepted by the Chinese Journal of International 
Politics, and will probably be published during 2014. It has not been copy-
edited, so the published version will differ somewhat from this version once 
adjusted for house style. Any citation from this version should make these 
points clear to the reader. This article must under no circumstances be 
circulated to anyone else without the permission of the author.] 
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(2003, with Ole Wæver); Does China Matter? (2004, co-edited with Rosemary 
Foot); The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-
First Century (2004); The Evolution of International Security Studies (2009, with 
Lene Hansen); ‘China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?’ The 
Chinese Journal of International Politics (2010); ‘China and the US: 
Comparable Cases of Peaceful Rise?’ The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics (2013, with Michael Cox). 
 
Abstract 
Despite the widespread view that China does not have a coherent grand 
strategy, it does not need to invent one. China has already articulated a grand 
strategy that is based on the home-grown idea of ‘peaceful rise/development’ 
(PRD). The key issue is whether the logic of this grand strategy, and the 
contradictions within it, are fully understood, and whether China has sufficient 
depth and coherence in its policy-making processes to implement such a 
strategy. Although there are elements of longer continuity in China’s strategic 
outlook, the transformation from Mao’s revolutionist strategy to Deng’s strategy 
of reform and opening up, involved a radical shift in China’s perception of itself, 
the world, and its place in the world. That shift provides a stable and coherent 
background against which to think about the ends and means of China’s grand 
strategy. The paper opens by looking at PRD’s status as a grand strategy. It 
then surveys the ends and the means of China’s foreign and security policy as 
they have evolved in practice and rhetoric. Finally, it assesses in depth China’s 
practice against three distinct strategic logics within PRD: cold, warm and hot 
peaceful rise. The conclusion is that China’s current practice points firmly 
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towards cold peaceful rise, but that warm peaceful rise is perhaps still possible 
and offers many strategic advantages. 
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Introduction1 
 
 There is a lively debate at the moment about whether China has a grand 
strategy or not.2 The general feeling is that it should have such a strategy, but 
many think it does not, and there is a fairly widespread view that China’s 
foreign policy is incoherent, reflecting the lack of a grand strategy. Shi Yihong, 
for example, has argued that China doesn’t have ‘a system of clear and 
coherent long-term fundamental national objectives, diplomatic philosophy and 
long-term or secular grand strategy’, and that this is ‘the No. 1 cognitive and 
policy difficulty for the current China in her international affairs.’3 More recently 
Zhu Liqun reaffirms this view, arguing that ‘China has always lacked a global 
strategy. It is now believed by many scholars that it is time for China to have 
one’. Not having one is ‘hardly sustainable over the next decade’.4 Westad 
argues that China has a very limited and conservative view of the world and no 
grand strategy to speak of.5 I have also argued that China lacks a coherent 
strategic vision of its place in international society, and fails to align ends and 
means, combining rhetorics of peaceful development and harmonious relations 
with several militarized border disputes with its neighbours, a lot of hard realist 
rhetoric, and political relationships bordering on enmity with Japan, Vietnam 
and India.6 Zhang makes the reasonable argument that while China has a 
vigorous debate about grand strategy, the country is evolving very fast, and the 
consequent continuous redefinition of itself and its interests makes it 
unsurprising that it as yet has no clear grand strategy. That said, he does find 
some consistency on the desired ends, but much less agreement about how to 
pursue those in terms of means. He sees China as muddling along, learning by 
doing.7 In a subsequent paper Zhang argues that China does have a vision 
behind its foreign policy in the sense of always seeing itself as a central player 
in world politics, albeit this is now driven by a defensive, self-centred and self-
righteous perspective in which China perceives ‘foreign misunderstanding, 
                                                 
1 All references to Kindle editions use location numbers. 
2 I would like to thank Wang Jiangli, Zhang Feng and Yongjin Zhang and two anonymous 
CJIP reviewers for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
3 Shi Yihong, ‘The Rising China: Essential Disposition, Secular Grand Strategy, and Current 
Prime Problems’, 2001, http://www.spfusa.org/Program/av2001/feb1202.pdf (accessed 
31/10/2008). 
4 Zhu Liqun, ‘Ongoing debates surrounding China’s identity’, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, 27 July 2012, p. 3. 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/ongoing-debates-surrounding-chinas-
identity/ (Accessed 1 July 2013.) 
5 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire (London: The Bodley Head, 2012), locs. 6727-31, 
7180, 7206. 
6 Barry Buzan, ‘China in International Society: Is “Peaceful Rise” Possible?’, Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010, pp. 29-33. 
7 Zhang Feng, ‘Rethinking China’s grand strategy: Beijing’s evolving national interests and 
strategic ideas in the reform era’, International Politics, Vol.49, No. 3, 2012, pp. 337-9. 
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prejudice and misapprehension’.8 Wang likewise thinks that there is no official 
statement of China’s grand strategy, but argues that indications of its 
components can be found.9  
 Heath thinks there is more than that. He uses research into Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) policy documents to tease out ‘guidance on the 
nation’s desired end state and supporting objectives, ways and means’, and 
finds a relatively coherent view of ‘national strategy’.10 But American realists 
are the biggest believers in China already having a grand strategy. Goldstein 
argues that by 1996 China had evolved a fairly clear grand strategy aimed at 
pursuing its own development and rising peacefully within a US dominated 
order.11 He sees this strategy as primarily transitional, to get China through a 
difficult period of relative weakness without generating ‘China threat’ reactions 
from other powers. But since he also sees this transition period as being quite 
long – perhaps several decades – this strategy is likely to be stable for some 
time so long as there are no big disruptions in the distribution of power. He 
argues that what will happen after China has risen is too far away to predict. 
Swaine and Tellis take a similar view and label China’s grand strategy as 
‘calculative’.12  
 The argument in this paper builds on Goldstein’s view, but is neither 
constrained by the hard realist perspective, nor skewed by the US-centric 
perspective, that underpin both his and Swaine and Tellis’s analyses. I do not 
presuppose, as realists must, either that China’s current strategy is necessarily 
transitional, or that strategy is predominantly driven by the distribution of power. 
I allow scope for the moral purpose of the state to influence grand strategy, and 
I try to take a neutral outside perspective. I also have the benefit of an 
additional decade of China’s foreign policy for looking at how coherently or not 
this grand strategy is being pursued in terms of the relationship of ends and 
means. And since the economic crisis beginning in 2008, both Goldstein’s and 
Swaine and Tellis’s assumption of several decades of unquestioned US 
hegemony is more under question.  
 China therefore does not need to invent a grand strategy because it has 
already articulated one that is based on a home-grown idea: ‘peaceful 
                                                 
8 Zhang Feng, ‘The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in international relations’, European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol 19, No. 2, 2013, pp. 307, 315, 322. See also Shih 
Chih-yu and Yin Jiwu, ‘Between Core National Interest and a Harmonious World: 
Reconciling Self-role Conceptions in Chinese Foreign Policy’, Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2013, pp. 65-6, 72. 
9 Wang Jisi, ‘China’s Search for a Grand Strategy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2, 2011, pp. 
68-79. 
10 Timothy R. Heath, ‘What Does China Want? Discerning the PRC’s National Strategy’, 
Asian Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012, p. 54. 
11 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International 
Security (Stanford CA.: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
12 Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, 
Present and Future (Santa Monica CA.: RAND Corporation, 2000), Kindle edn. 
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rise/development’ (PRD).13 PRD has been something of a mantra in China’s 
foreign policy pronouncements for over a decade,14 formalising the practices 
observed by Goldstein and Swaine and Tellis from the mid-1990s. So PRD is 
not just an abstract idea, but one that has had well-rooted standing in China’s 
policy and rhetoric for nearly two decades. It is an indigenous and original idea 
deeply embedded in China’s reform and opening up, and effectively 
constituting the core concept for a grand strategy. While not without its 
ambiguities and contradictions, PRD is both a potentially workable program, 
and a distinctive way of marking China’s return to great power standing in 
international society. The term ‘peaceful rise’ had a brief vogue during 2003-4 
and was then replaced by the more bland phrase ‘peaceful development’ on 
the grounds that ‘rise’ sounded too provocative. It was a way of synthesizing 
the linkage between peace and development that was implicit in Deng’s original 
formulation of reform and opening up and also a way of reassuring the 
neighbours.15 Development was always the means to rise, not an alternative in 
any sense, and thus the label PRD for China’s grand strategy is the most 
honest and appropriate one. I combine the two, because only taken together do 
they capture the essence of China’s strategic problematic: 1) the urgent need 
to develop; 2) the necessity for global engagement to do that quickly; 3) the 
consequence of China’s neighbours and other great powers being unsettled, or 
feeling threatened, by the rising power generated by the successes of 
development in such a large country; and 4) the resulting security spiral 
threatening the global engagement on which the economy depends. China’s 
geopolitical location, like rising Germany’s a century ago, is challenging.16 A big 
country with many neighbours needs to work very hard to avoid others seeing 
its rise as threatening. 
 The question is therefore not whether China does or doesn’t have a 
grand strategy. It does. The key issue is whether the logic of this grand 
strategy, and the contradictions within it, are fully understood, and whether 
China has sufficient depth and coherence in its policy-making processes to 
                                                 
13 Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2006), Kindle edn., locs. 3042-3201; Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘The 
Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the 
Theory of “Peaceful Rise”’, The China Quarterly, No. 190, 2007, pp. 291-310; Dominik 
Mierzejewski, ‘Public Discourse on the ‘Peaceful­Rise’ Concept in Mainland China’, 
Discussion Paper 42, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, 2009, 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/discussion-papers/discussion-paper-42-
mierzejewski-power-rise-discourse.pdf  (accessed 25 September 2012); Barry Buzan, ‘China 
in International Society’.  
14 See, for example: ‘China’s Peaceful Development’, Information Office of the State Council, 
People’s Republic of China, Beijing, September 2011. http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-
09/06/content_1941354.htm (accessed 24 March 2014). 
15 Zhang Feng, ‘Rethinking China’s grand strategy’, pp. 331-2. 
16 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, locs. 374-83; Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. 
Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy, locs. 384-91. 
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implement such a strategy. Although there are elements of longer continuity in 
China’s strategic outlook, most obviously in seeing itself as a central player in 
world politics,17 I focus in this article on the period since the late 1970s. The 
transformation around that time from Mao’s revolutionist strategy to Deng’s 
strategy of reform and opening up, involved a radical shift in China’s perception 
of itself, the world, and its place in the world. That shift provides a fairly stable 
and coherent background against which to think about the ends and means of 
China’s grand strategy. 
 The next section looks at how PRD qualifies to be a grand strategy. The 
following two sections survey the end and means of China’s foreign and 
security policy as they have evolved since the late 1970s. The penultimate 
section differentiates PRD into three distinct grand strategy options for China: 
cold, warm and hot peaceful rise, and examines their implications in some 
detail. The Conclusion argues that China has a real choice between the first 
two of these paths to PRD. On its current trajectory, China is heading for a cold 
peaceful rise, but a grand strategy of warm peaceful rise has many advantages 
and is still just about within reach. 
 
PRD as a Grand Strategy 
 
 The basic concept of grand strategy is quite straightforward. It is about 
articulating a set of core aims, or ends, that define the national interest in terms 
of both domestic goals and how state and society are to relate to the wider 
world, and relating those ends to the means that the state and society has 
available.18 The functions of grand strategy might be thought of as follows: 
 To establish criteria for foreign and security policy formulation and 
evaluation. 
 To create coherence in foreign and security policy by providing a stable 
overarching framework for policy choices. 
 To embed and legitimize foreign and security policy politically by 
explaining it to the citizenry in broad terms, and especially to explain 
difficult choices. 
                                                 
17 Zhang Feng, ‘The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in international relations’. 
18 On the definition of grand strategy see: Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and 
Willliam C. Wohlforth, ‘Don’t Come Home America: The Case against Retrenchment, 
International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2012/13, p. 11; Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and 
International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 
2012) Kindle edn., locs. 283-92; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, loc. 239; Rodger 
A. Payne, ‘Cooperative Security: Grand Strategy Meets Critical Theory’, Millennium, Vol. 40, 
No. 3, 2012, p. 608. On US grand strategy see Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and 
Willliam C. Wohlforth, ‘Don’t Come Home America’, pp. 11-13; Paul D. Miller, ‘Five Pillars of 
American Grand Strategy’, Survival, Vol. 54, No. 5, 2012, pp. 7-44.  
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 To project an image of the country to the rest of the world (and that 
image might be anything from offensive and revolutionary, such as Mao’s 
China, to defensive and status quo, such as Sweden). 
Wang discusses how China’s policy options suggest some classical choices in 
grand strategy, the main one being between self-strengthening versus 
cooperation, transparency and reassurance, or in other words going it alone or 
pursuing multilateral solutions to problems of shared fate.19 This is the classical 
choice between the realist idea of raison d’etat, and the English School concept 
of raison de système (‘the belief that it pays to make the system work’).20 In the 
case of an authoritarian state like China there is also the issue of finding the 
balance between the state as the main agent for grand strategy, and allowing 
civil society to project itself outward as the foundation of soft power. 
 PRD was implicit in Deng’s linking of peace and development from the 
late 1970s as the underpinning for reform and opening up:  
Deng transformed the main foreign policy task to be the search for a 
peaceful environment for China’s modernization. As a further justification 
for the new policy, he began to propose in the mid-1980s that ‘peace and 
development’, not war and revolution, had become the main themes of 
international politics of the era.21  
At the same time, China abandoned alliances as a policy and moved towards 
an independent and nonaligned foreign policy.22 China thus made a big shift 
away from revolutionist assumptions about itself and the world. The new 
analysis saw the threat of great power war as low, the need for economic 
development in China as very high, and therefore the opportunity for China to 
engage with the global economy as both necessary and relatively safe. China 
needed both to make up the ground it had lost and to move away from the 
failing Soviet model. It had to recover from the excesses of the Maoist years 
and focus on becoming wealthy and powerful, while at the same time 
maintaining the legitimacy of socialism and the CCP.23 It could only do this if it 
abandoned total state control over the economy, and created significant space 
for the market to operate. This move in turn required that China engage 
economically with both its neighbours and the world, and become part of the 
global systems of trade, investment and finance. China’s commitment to PRD 
was thus instrumental, but deep. China put its own economic development as 
top priority, and deduced from that the need for stability in its international 
relations both regionally and globally.24 This change was driven by internal 
                                                 
19 Wang Jisi, ‘China’s Search for a Grand Strategy’. 
20 Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992) p. 14. 
21 Zhang Feng, ‘Rethinking China’s grand strategy’, p. 322. 
22 Zhang Feng, ‘China’s New Thinking on Alliances’, Survival, Vol. 54, No. 5, 2012, pp. 129-
30. 
23 Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era. 
24 Zhang Yongjin, China in International Society Since 1949 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998) 
pp. 102-25, 194-243. 
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developments in China during the late 1970s and early 1980s in which the 
country underwent a profound change of national identity, strategic culture and 
definition of its security interests, all of which transformed its relationship with 
international society.25  
 Thus the basic idea of PRD has been implicitly in place as China’s grand 
strategy since the early 1980s. It linked peace and development both in the 
sense that it contained an assessment of the international environment as 
basically peaceful and orientated towards development, and in the sense that 
China’s policy would be one of peace and development to fit into this. Deng’s 
still influential idea that China should keep a low profile and not flaunt its 
strength was part of the package of putting development as the first priority, 
and gave an important indication about the means element of China’s grand 
strategy. This idea is still very influential in China’s foreign and security policy, 
but with increasing debate about whether China’s rise is now sufficiently 
advanced that it should be modified or even abandoned.26 Nevertheless, PRD 
still remains in place, with a notable recent restatement by Dai Bingguo.27 
 PRD was remarkable not only because it was a clever, expedient policy 
to cover a transitional period of Chinese weakness, but also because, unlike 
many great power grand strategies, it had the sophistication to take into 
account how others would be likely to react to the rise of China’s power. Grand 
strategies require a choice. They can be status quo or revisionist. Status quo 
powers are generally happy with both the rules and the status distribution of the 
prevailing international society. Revisionist powers come in three gradients. 
They can be revolutionary revisionist, wanting to change both the rules and the 
status hierarchy, prepared to resort to fair means or foul, and not caring too 
much about who gets in the way. Or they can be radical revisionist, pursuing 
changes in the rules, but doing so mainly within the existing framework of 
international society. Or they can be orthodox revisionist, generally happy with 
the rules, but wanting changes in the distribution of status.28 China under Mao 
was a revolutionary revisionist power. PRD points at least to orthodox 
revisionism, leaving open the possibility of radical revisionism. Some have 
                                                 
25 Qin Yaqing, ‘Nation Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests: Three Hypotheses 
on the Interaction between China and International Society’, SIIS Journal, No. 2, 2003, 
http://irchina.org/en/xueren/china/view.asp?id=863  (accessed 4 December 2008); Qin 
Yaqing, ‘China’s Security Strategy with a Special Focus on East Asia”, transcript of a talk 
and discussion for the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 7 July 2004  
http://www.spf.org/e/report/040707.html  (accessed 4 December 2008). 
26 Zhang Feng, ‘China’s New Thinking on Alliances’, pp. 138, 141; Ma Lien ‘Thinking of 
China’s Grand Strategy’, pp. 163-5. 
27 Dai Bingguo, ‘We Must Stick to the Path of Peaceful Development,’ Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, People’s Republic of China, December 6, 2010. 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/cpop/t777704.htm# (Accessed 22 August 2013). See 
also Information Office of the State Council, ‘China’s Peaceful Development’. 
28 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2007 [1991]) pp. 237-46. 
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claimed that China is a status quo power,29 but that does not seem plausible 
within the framing of PRD. 
 PRD therefore qualifies as a grand strategy. It contains a theory about 
how the world works and how China should relate to that world in the light of its 
overriding priority to development. It takes military, political and economic 
elements into account, and is sensitive to what kind of image China should 
project to the world. It thus sets a framework for defining China’s national 
interests, and offers a basic principle about how to relate means to ends. 
Having established the plausibility of PRD as a grand strategy, the next task is 
to look in more detail at the ends and means of China’s foreign and security 
policy as they have evolved in practice and rhetoric over the past three 
decades. With that established, one can then assess the relationship between 
the actual practice of China’s foreign and security policy and PRD as a grand 
strategy.  
 
The Ends of China’s Foreign and Security Policy 
 
 The literature about China’s aims and national interests in its relations 
with the world since the reform and opening up, shows a considerable 
consensus on the country’s core goals, and lines up reasonably well with the 
declarations of China’s government about its strategic objectives. From the 
beginnings of its reform and opening up China was clear that its aim was to 
increase both prosperity and power, explicitly rejecting the Japanese model of 
focusing primarily on prosperity and suppressing the issue of great power 
status.30 Deng’s three goals from the 1980s were: national unification, anti-
hegemony and economic development,31 and these have remained central 
aims for China’s grand strategy.32 Territorial integrity is mainly about Taiwan, 
Tibet and Xinjiang, and success on these issues is closely linked to the 
cultivation of China’s capabilities and status as a great power.33 It has been a 
longstanding aspiration of China’s leaders and people to restore China’s great 
                                                 
29 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 
4, 2003, pp. 5-56; Qin Yaqing, ‘Nation Identity, Strategic Culture and Security Interests’; Qin 
Yaqing, ‘China’s Security Strategy with a Special Focus on East Asia’; Feng Huiyun ‘Is 
China a Revisionist Power?’, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2008, 
pp. 313-34; Pan Zhongqi, ‘China’s Changing Image of and Engagement in World Order’, in 
Sujian Guo, Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, (eds.), Harmonious World and China’s New Foreign 
Policy (New York/Lexington: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 39-63. 
30 Gerald Segal, ‘As China Grows Strong’, International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, 1988, pp. 
231. 
31 Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, locs. 411,1537. 
32 Timothy R. Heath, ‘What Does China Want?’ pp. 63-6 
33 Wu Xinbo ‘China: Security Practice for a Modernizing and Ascending Power’, in Muthiah 
Alagappa (ed.) Asian Security Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998) pp. 129-
32. 
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power status,34 and this of course is also central to the pursuit of anti-
hegemony. For Deng, economic development was a necessary condition for 
achieving the other two main goals of recovering Taiwan and opposing US 
hegemony.35 The aim has been to secure a relative increase in China’s power, 
status and influence in international society in relation to the US especially, but 
also Japan, Russia and Europe globally, and within its region.36 China wants a 
more multipolar world with more autonomous regions.37 
 Economic growth was also instrumental to the goal of sustaining the 
legitimacy of the CCP for one-party rule,38 which could be read as an aspect of 
national unification. There were two instrumental logics behind the need for 
economic growth: to support China’s aspiration to be a great power, and to 
support the legitimacy of the CCP by sharing wealth with the Chinese people.39 
Economic growth could also be an important end in itself, as in the liberal 
tradition, in the sense of serving the people, and indeed by contributing to the 
global economy, also serving the rest of humankind.40 Although the pursuit of 
economic growth seemed to be a win-win formulation in several ways, in a 
deeper sense it opened the way for a contradiction between the goal of 
preserving China’s political system and social stability, and the goal of pursuing 
economic development as the first priority. Rapid economic development is in 
itself a socially destabilising process, requiring huge numbers of people to 
change both their location (rural to urban), and their class identity. Down the 
line it also opened up a tension for the CCP. While people might appreciate the 
delivery of increasing prosperity to wider sections of society, market 
development generates a market society full of wealthy, educated, opinionated, 
and self-seeking people. Such a society is not a comfortable constituency for a 
ruling party still thinking of itself as communist. China has not yet developed a 
convincing model of state-society relations, and this is a key problem for its 
                                                 
34 Wu Xinbo ‘China: Security Practice for a Modernizing and Ascending Power’, p.115; Yan 
Xuetong, ‘The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 10, No. 
26, 2001, p. 34. 
35 Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, locs. 528-62 
36 Wu Xinbo ‘China: Security Practice for a Modernizing and Ascending Power’, pp. 135-6; 
Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004) pp. 2-
3; Rosemary Foot, ‘Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating and 
hedging’, International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2006, pp. 77-94. 
37 Wu Xinbo ‘China: Security Practice for a Modernizing and Ascending Power’, pp. 136-9; 
Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, loc. 316. 
38 Liselotte Odegaard, China and Coexistence: Beijing’s National Security Strategy for the 
Twenty-First Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012) p. 197. 
39 Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, loc. 1503-1639. 
40 Wu Xinbo ‘China: Security Practice for a Modernizing and Ascending Power’, pp. 127-9; 
Yan Xuetong, ‘The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes’, pp. 35, 38; Jeffrey W. Legro, ‘What 
China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, 
No. 3, 2007, pp. 505-34; Information Office of the State Council, ‘China’s Peaceful 
Development’. 
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global image and legitimacy.41 There is also the enduring contradiction of China 
needing to participate in a US-led global economic order in order to forward its 
development goals, while at the same time opposing US hegemony/unipolarity, 
and seeing the US as its main rival.42 The widening of China’s security 
perspective during the 1980s opened up tensions between the requirements of 
economic interdependence, and the more traditional security goals around 
sovereignty, territory and regime security.43 Concern about regime security 
heightened after 1989 when the fall of the Soviet Union left China as a political 
outlier among the great powers.44 
 Domestic concerns have primacy in China’s foreign policy.45 Wang 
identifies three strategic goals for China: 1) safeguard the CCP leadership and 
socialist system; 2) safeguard sovereignty, territory and unity; and 3) sustain 
the country’s economic and social development.46 There is certainly evidence 
to support the view that maintaining the continuity of CCP rule and the socialist 
system is one of the core aims of China’s strategy.47 Deng used the tension 
between globalization and nationalism to justify the one-party rule of the CCP 
as a way of handling the stresses of rapid modernization.48 This linkage of 
regime security to continued economic growth has been maintained.49 Wu 
notes that: ‘regime security is usually considered an element of national 
security’.50 Even China’s concern to maintain cultural distinctiveness and avoid 
Westernization,51 can be read as eliding with regime security and sovereignty: 
it has even been argued that the recent concern with soft power reflects the 
                                                 
41 Liselotte Odegaard, China and Coexistence, pp. 162, 188-94. 
42 Rosemary Foot, ‘Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order’, pp. 84-94. 
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necessity to defend the legitimacy of the CCP against Western cultural 
penetration.52 
 In the eyes of the regime there is therefore a close two-way linkage 
between the security of CCP rule (necessary to guide the turbulent path of 
rapid development), and the maintenance of economic growth (necessary both 
to support the legitimacy of CCP rule, and to lift all boats at the same time as 
capitalist-style development raises inequalities within China). China has a GINI 
coefficient of 0.48, a level of inequality around 50% higher than when it began 
its market reforms.53 That is significantly higher than in prominent liberal 
democratic states such as the US and Britain, and twice the level of many 
social democratic states, most notably the Nordic countries. Because China is 
now embarked on a market mode of development, albeit an authoritarian one, 
this interdependence between regime security and economic development is 
extended into the international sphere54. Market development requires 
sustained access to external consumers, products and resources.55 Peaceful 
development and the pursuit of a harmonious society and world, thus require 
linking China’s domestic and overseas policies.56 This linkage is reflected in 
more recent statements about China’s aims. Shih and Yin cite the 2002 
government White Paper giving the official position on China’s national 
interests as: 
‘safeguarding state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security; 
upholding economic development as the central task and unremittingly 
enhancing the overall national strength; adhering to and improving the 
socialist system; maintaining and promoting social stability and harmony; 
and striving for an international environment of lasting peace and a 
favourable climate in China’s periphery.’57 
This White Paper takes a somewhat harder line than Deng’s, focusing more on 
China’s development, autonomy and power, with anti-hegemony less explicit. 
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More explicit than in Deng’s formulation is that China has to strive to maintain a 
peaceful or ‘favourable’ global and regional international environment within 
which to pursue its development,58 a line that became prominent after 1989.59  
 But what does ‘a favourable regional environment’ mean? It could mean 
that China has relaxed, friendly, consensual and cooperative relations with its 
neighbours, facilitating economic relations and minimising security concerns. 
But it could also mean that China successfully intimidates its neighbours into 
compliance with its interests, effectively creating a ‘favourable environment’ by 
hegemonic means at the expense of its neighbours. The Chinese government 
denies this: ‘China does not seek regional hegemony or sphere of influence’.60 
Yet several analysts argue that embedded in the ‘favourable regional 
environment’ goal, is an aim or expectation of Chinese pre-eminence in the 
East Asian region.61 The language is certainly flexible enough to support such 
an interpretation, and its fits smoothly with the greater emphasis on increasing 
China’s national power. If one of the aims of China’s strategy is some kind of 
regional hegemony in East Asia, then this will not only generate resistance to 
China within the region (already visible in response to China’s more assertive 
pursuit of maritime claims since 2008), but also make it much more difficult for 
the US to accept China’s rise. That in turn would reinforce the view of those in 
China who think that the US is blocking China’s rise.62 There is also a tension 
between the pursuit of power and regional suzerainty on the one hand, and 
China’s commitment to anti-hegemonism on the other.63 Though in Chinese 
eyes this can perhaps be squared by the Chinese tradition of harmonious 
centrality, others are likely to see it as a Chinese version of the US’s Monroe 
Doctrine of regional hegemony.64 This is a crucial issue for what kind of image 
of itself China projects abroad. The potential for this clash was illustrated by the 
tensions between the US and China that sprang up in 2010 when China 
appeared to extend its core national interests to include the South China Sea, 
by implication raising its commitment there to the same level as that over 
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Taiwan;65 and in 2013 over China’s assertion of an air defence zone covering 
islands administered and claimed by Japan, and areas claimed by Korea. 
 There is now a debate within China about the need to find a new path 
that moves away from Deng’s idea of keeping a low profile.66 The difficulty is 
how to play China’s new power, status and responsibility within international 
society, while not tipping over into a stance that looks threatening and 
domineering to others. Unsurprisingly, especially since 1989, China has been 
concerned to counter the ‘China threat’ theory, which arose partly as a result of 
its rising power, but also because of foreign reactions to the internal crackdown 
of 1989.67 This issue underlines an ongoing problem for China which Zhang 
presciently characterised as its ‘entrenched ambivalence towards its full 
integration into international society’.68 China has been successful in adapting 
to most of the classical Westphalian norms of international society 
(sovereignty/non-intervention, territoriality, diplomacy, international law, 
balance of power, war and nationalism), and since 1978 has notably adapted to 
the market. But while adapting to economic liberalism, it has then been caught 
by the Western move to shift international society towards more politically 
liberal norms, especially human rights and democracy, which China under the 
CCP could not follow.69 Arguably China is also ambivalent about the 
Westphalian institution of great power leadership, opposing US leadership 
under the anti-hegemony principle, but not wanting itself to take a leadership 
role. This reflects a tension between China’s desire to increase its power and 
status within international society, while at the same time being reluctant to 
take responsibility on the grounds of needing to prioritize its own development, 
which also benefits the rest of the world.70 Its position seems to be that it is in 
principle prepared to take more international responsibility, but in practice will 
not do so until it has made considerably more progress in increasing its own 
wealth and power.71 China faces the additional difficulty that it is an outlier 
amongst the great powers in not being a democracy. This opens another 
contradiction with the resort to classical culture as a soft power resource: Yan 
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argues from the theme of ‘humane authority’ in the Chinese classics that China 
needs to become more open and democratic internally if it is to acquire status 
as a leading world power.72 
 Distilling this discussion down to its essentials yields seven core aims of 
China’s grand strategy in practice over the last thirty-five years. 
 Maintaining the exclusive rule of the communist party; 
 Maintaining high economic growth; 
 Maintaining the stability of Chinese society; 
 Defending the country’s territorial integrity, including reunification and 
territorial disputes; 
 Increasing China’s national power relative to the US, other great powers 
and China’s neighbours, and achieving a more multipolar, less US-
dominated, world order (anti-hegemonism); 
 Maintaining favourable regional and global conditions for China’s 
development; 
 Avoiding having others perceive China as threatening. 
 Domestic concerns do indeed seem to have a strong priority in China’s 
foreign policy. Although both China and the US want to increase domestic 
prosperity, unlike China the US does not securitize either its form of 
government or its social stability, whereas China quite openly feels insecure 
about both. As one would expect, many elements of China’s grand strategy are 
pretty conventional and unexceptional in a general sense, such as 
safeguarding territorial integrity and sovereignty and pursuing development and 
prosperity. Perhaps a bit more surprising given the pace of change in China, is 
the notable consistency of this set for over three decades. But the particulars 
are important, especially where normally uncontroversial general goals such as 
sovereignty and territorial integrity incorporate seriously disputed claims such 
as over Taiwan, along the border with India, and over the islands in the East 
and South China Seas. Unlike for the US, at least since the US civil war, 
China’s territorial issues blend standard, status quo, defensive aims with a set 
of unresolved disputes that have large revisionist implications both for its 
relations with its neighbours, and for whether or not the rest of the world see 
China’s rising power as peaceful or threatening.73 While the US goals of 
promoting a liberal order and managing international institutions speak to its 
status quo position as the dominant power,74 China’s aims are more those of a 
revisionist power. It wants to change the global distribution of power in its 
favour, resolve territorial disputes on that basis, and contest some of the rules 
of international society. Like the US, China wants to manage its external 
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environment, but unlike the US China projects no ideological preference on the 
system level, confining that aspect to preserving its own domestic political 
order.  
 
The Means of China’s Foreign and Security Policy 
 
 As hinted above, over the last thirty years, the success of Deng’s 
development policy has transformed the ‘means’ part of China’s foreign and 
security policy even while the ends have remained fairly stable. The rise in 
China’s material capabilities is now such a commonplace observation that it 
does not need much documenting here. Between 1993 and 2012 China’s GDP 
has grown six fold in absolute terms, and has closed the gap with the US from 
being less than 10% of the US’s GDP in 1993 to being about one-third of it in 
2012.75 China’s military expenditure has increased more than eight-and-a-half 
times between 1989 and 2012, rising from about 1/30th of the US level to about 
one-quarter of it.76 China has also improved its position in international society 
terms, most notably by developing an active role in East Asian regional 
organizations during the 1990s, and by joining the WTO in 2001. The effect of 
its rapid development is amplified by its being such a huge country. During the 
past thirty years China has been transformed from being a relatively minor 
great power to being in many respects number two in the world. Its growth has 
thus impacted strongly not only on its neighbours, where it looms much larger 
within East, Central and South Asia, but also on the distribution of power at the 
global level.  
 But while simple capabilities are important, they are certainly not the 
whole story. Equally important is what choices a country makes about how to 
deploy the capabilities it has. Does it prefer hard power and military means as 
its first choice, or soft power and economic, political and cultural means? 
Uncertainty about how China will deploy its new strength means that the 
absolute and relative growth of China’s power generates unease and hedging 
behaviour in others. 
 When Deng set out the basic framework of PRD, it came not only with his 
three goals, but also with a policy about means. Deng shifted to an assumption 
of a relatively benign international environment for China with a low risk of war 
and a high opportunity for economic interdependence. His strategy was to take 
advantage of this to accelerate China’s economic development and increase its 
power. Deng’s policy meant that China gave priority to economic over military 
development, and mainly played along with the existing rules of international 
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society so as to avoid appearing to be a challenger to the status quo. This 
strategy was designed to enable China to focus as much as possible on its own 
development and self-strengthening by avoiding the burden of international 
commitments, conflicts and leadership roles. Probably it was intended as a 
temporary and instrumental strategy meant to cover the transitional period in 
which China would be rising, but still relatively weak. This left open the 
question about what the strategy should be once China had got through that 
transition. That question could be discounted while China was still weak, but 
now that China is well up in the ranks of the world powers, it has become much 
more important both to China’s neighbours and the other great powers. As 
noted above, there is now a debate within China about the need to find a new 
path that moves away from Deng’s idea of keeping a low profile. Although 
China is still keen to hang onto its status as a developing country,77 some 
argue that it has already accomplished its rise.78 If this is correct, along with the 
weakening of the US since 2008, it would undermine Goldstein’s assumption 
that the transition would take several decades. 
 The importance of this question has been underlined by the widespread 
view that China’s policy has become more assertive since the onset of the 
global economic crisis and the perceived weakening of the US in 2008.79 This 
view is supported by the much quoted 2010 remark of foreign minister Yang 
Jiechi at an ASEAN meeting in 2010 that: ‘China is a big country and other 
countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact’.80 That remark suggested 
the abandonment of both the low profile position and the restrained view on 
means. There is a contrary view arguing that very little of what is seen as 
China’s ‘new assertiveness’ is either notably aggressive or out of line with what 
came earlier,81 but also evidence that many Chinese analysts agree with the 
idea of a more assertive turn after 2008, and mostly think that this has had 
negative consequences for China.82 Others also argue that this new 
assertiveness since 2008, when combined with the growth of China’s power, 
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has alienated China’s neighbours in Southeast Asia and reversed its diplomatic 
gains there from the 1990s.83  
 This shift plays into the view long held by many external commentators 
on China that, Confucian rhetoric notwithstanding, its strategic thinking is 
fundamentally guided by realist power politics.84 It is not difficult to find 
examples of such thinking in China,85 and to the extent that such views prevail 
in China, or are thought by outsiders to prevail, this creates a risk that PRD will 
be seen as mere propaganda: a strategy of deception.  
 There has, for example, been a durable contradiction between the 
rhetoric of PRD and a stable regional environment on the one hand, and 
China’s threat to reunify Taiwan by force if necessary on the other.86 A similar 
contradiction has attended China’s ongoing bad relations with Japan.87 China 
remains highly suspicious of Japan and gives it no credit at all for its over 
seventy years of pacifism.88 Roy’s prediction that the growth of China’s power 
would eventually trigger Japanese rearmament, overriding the domestic 
constraints, seems to be happening now under the Abe administration.89 It is a 
worrying thought that the current leaderships in both Japan and China might 
welcome the rise in tensions between the two countries as a means to help 
them pursue difficult domestic reform agendas. The turn since 2008 extends 
this contradiction to China’s relations with Southeast Asia. The tension is very 
clear in a recent authoritative statement.90 On the one hand this document 
contains lines that seem to reaffirm PRD, by maintaining China’s rejection of 
hegemonism, and commiting China to a strategy of peace and harmony: 
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‘peaceful development and cooperation’ as ‘the irresistible trend of the times’, 
and ‘if a country wants to develop itself it must let other develop too; if a 
country wants to have security it must make others feel safe too’,  ‘This is the 
policy that will not change in 100 or 1000 years’. On the other hand, it contains 
lines that seem to reaffirm a hard realist disposition, explicitly defining its 
neighbours as threatening, and threatening harsh policies against them. It 
reaffirms China’s claim to Taiwan, and threatens to deny access to co-
development with China to anyone who finds fault with, or makes trouble for, 
China, or engages in containment of China by ‘conducting joint military 
exercises in China’s adjacent waters’. That last criterion would apply to Japan, 
South Korea, India, Australia and quite a few of the members of ASEAN, and 
supports the argument that China wants regional pre-eminence. 
 China therefore seems to be on a cusp in relation to the question of 
means. Deng’s old formula for a low profile seems less relevant given that 
China’s is no longer so weak, and the US not so strong. But turns to a more 
assertive use of power bring negative reactions that threaten the aim of 
keeping neighbours and other great powers from seeing China as a threat. This 
tension speaks to contradictions within China’s aims between pursuing 
unification, and thus a range of territorial disputes, and cultivating a friendly and 
harmonious international environment for China’s development. It also speaks 
to a contradiction between ends and means: between China’s rhetoric of PRD 
and its apparent turn to more assertive, even aggressive, behaviour. It is a very 
predictable consequence of this mix of PRD rhetoric and assertive/aggressive 
behaviour that it will generate fear, and suspicion that China’s PRD rhetoric is 
just a hypocritical cover for what is actually a rising power looking to dominate 
its region. The many foreign readers of Sun Tse’s Art of War, will have taken 
note of its strong emphasis on strategic deception, and read China’s policy in 
that light. Even a mix of some peaceful and some assertive/aggressive 
behaviour will, on the realist logic of prudence, generate hedging and power-
balancing behaviour by China’s neighbours. This issue will be crucial to the 
viability or not of PRD as a grand strategy for China, on which more below. 
 The evidence to date suggests that China’s leaders have yet to make up 
their minds about the relationship between ends and means in the practice of 
its foreign and security policy. The Dengist line is still influential, but 
increasingly questioned. What should replace it, and how that might or might 
not relate to PRD remains an open question. There is no consensus in China 
about how to conduct its foreign policy, with many different lines of thought and 
much argument.91 China’s foreign policy thus reflects a conflicted identity torn 
between harmonious world and core national interests.92 
 The difficult issue of nationalism plays strongly into this uncertainty. Deng 
introduced nationalism during the 1980s as a way of handling the legitimacy 
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crisis for socialism and the CCP created by the shift to reform and opening up. 
Nationalism usefully bridged between left and right opinion.93 But nationalism 
then took on a life of its own, feeding on the ‘victimhood’ view of history which 
constructs Japan and the US as China’s enemies. This narrative, introduced 
during the 1990s,94 puts increasing pressure on the pursuit of a peaceful global 
and regional international environment within which to pursue China’s 
development.95 It creates a danger of negative feedback loops among 
northeast Asian nationalisms,96 a phenomenon all too visible during Sino-
Japanese tensions over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute during 2012-14. 
From the 1990s, pressure from nationalist public opinion to take a tougher line 
with the US and China’s neighbours has been an important factor in Chinese 
foreign policy and the struggle of the party to preserve its legitimacy.97 Hughes 
details the damage done to China’s foreign and domestic policy goals by the 
extent to which both have become hostages to the nationalist opinion that was 
unleashed and cultivated by the CCP itself.98 Ross follows this line, seeing the 
rising influence of nationalist opinion, and the vulnerability of the CCP to it, as 
being mainly responsible for the more assertive turn in China’s foreign policy 
since 2009.99 In its very nature, strong nationalism tends to be corrosive of the 
sensitivity to how others will react that was one of the key features of Deng’s 
original PRD policy. A mix of realist behaviour and strident nationalist rhetoric 
makes it difficult to project a strategic image of China’s rise as benign and 
peaceful. 
 China’s choices about the ends and means of its foreign and security 
policy, and the impact that they make, are heavily constrained by the CCP’s 
preference for maintaining a lot of state control not only over its domestic 
economic and political sphere, but also over the country’s international 
engagements. China’s authoritarian style of market economy, for example, 
means that the government wants to keep control of its currency and insulate it 
from global market turbulence, which in turn means that it cannot easily 
promote the RMB as a challenger to the US dollar as a global reserve 
currency.100 As noted above, there is a consensus that China is weak in soft 
power, and needs to cultivate it to help counter the China threat thesis, resist 
the penetration of Western culture, and as a general attribute of a great power. 
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Yet there is a problem of how to reconcile the potential soft power resource of 
China’s traditional culture with the legitimacy needs of the CCP.101 And the 
government mistakenly tries to cultivate soft power at the state level rather than 
allowing it to emanate naturally from civil society.102 Indeed, the CCP’s 
controlling attitudes towards the arts and civil society actively stifles the natural 
development of China’s soft power and amplifies concern about how China will 
use its rising power. Even the promotion of Confucianism and China’s classical 
heritage as a soft power resource is problematic. The rhetoric of harmonious 
relations comes out of Confucian logic, yet as Qin admits, in that logic harmony 
is closely linked to a framing of hierarchical relationships.103 If China promotes 
harmony, does it thus also promote hierarchy despite its continuous rhetoric 
about supporting sovereign equality? If so who is envisaged as being at the top 
of the pile, and is the hierarchy consensual or imposed? Given its anti-
hegemony/multipolarity line against the US, and its rejection of a leadership 
role for itself,104 China clearly does not envisage harmony in a US-led system, 
but does not want to take over the US role. The unresolved link between 
harmony and hierarchy reinforces the suspicions of those who worry that 
China’s pursuit of a stable regional environment involves establishing its own 
primacy in East Asia. 
 
 To sum up this discussion, one can see that in the practice of China’s 
foreign and security policy over the last three decades there are a number of 
quite serious contradictions, some of them among ends, some of them 
between ends and means. The general problem for China is how to increase its 
power without creating insecurities and fears among its neighbours and/or the 
other great powers sufficient either to threaten China’s economic ties to the 
global economy, or trigger major military competition. Within this there are 
several more specific dilemmas: 
 How to pursue territorial disputes and an aspiration to regional primacy, 
while striving to maintain a peaceful and favourable international 
environment and harmonious relations with both neighbours and the US, 
especially in the context of the more assertive turn since 2008 and the threat 
to reunify Taiwan by force? 
 How both to integrate China into a US-led global economic order and 
promote a stable international environment for China’s development, while 
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treating the US as a strategic rival and the focus of anti-hegemonism, while 
China refuses to take a leading role itself? 
 How to feature anti-hegemonism as a general goal while apparently 
coveting primacy within its home region? 
 How to pursue stability domestically by the use of internal crackdowns (as in 
1989 and recently), while countering the ‘China threat theory’, when such 
crackdowns tarnish China’s image abroad and make its regime look more 
threatening in the context of its rising power. 
 How to cultivate nationalism and a sense of historical victimhood to bolster 
regime legitimacy domestically, without becoming hostage to nationalist 
opinion regarding the military pursuit of territorial disputes, and the casting 
of Japan and the US as enemies, and so ramping up the ‘China threat 
theory’. 
 How to achieve rapid development without not only destabilising Chinese 
society, but also creating a market society ruled by a communist party, thus 
threatening the goals of social stability/harmony and maintaining the rule of 
the CCP? 
 How to reconcile the high priority to domestic and regime security issues 
with the unavoidable linkage of China’s development to a Western-
dominated global economy? 
 How to pursue soft power by re-legitimizing the use of classical Chinese 
thought and culture, while maintaining the legitimacy of the CCP and the 
anti-democratic line, and seeming to link China’s rhetoric of harmony with 
hierarchical relationships? 
Underlying all this is the question of whether PRD is just a temporary expedient 
to cover a transitional period of weakness (the realist view), or a long run grand 
strategy to define China’s place in international society? 
 With this overview of ends and means in mind, we can now turn to the 
consideration of PRD as a grand strategy for China. 
 
PRD as a Grand Strategy for China 
 
 From the discussion so far we can see that China has a reasonably clear 
and stable set of aims that involve continued increases in the country’s 
absolute and relative power, continued development and increase in prosperity, 
defence of territorial integrity, and continued domestic stability and CCP rule. It 
seems reasonable to assume that the broad pattern of these aims will remain 
stable, leaving the question as to what kind of grand strategy might best and 
most cost-effectively pursue them. The difficult question in relation to aims is 
whether China seeks a stable and harmonious regional and global environment 
as a desirable end in itself, or merely as an instrumental goal to underpin its 
own development and rise. Put another way, was PRD just a transitional 
strategy, to be abandoned now that China is strong, or is it a long-term 
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strategy? Another difficult question is about the means of China’s policy. These 
will almost certainly continue to increase, raising the question about how these 
rising capabilities should best and most cost-effectively be deployed in a grand 
strategy. 
 If there is no question that China’s grand strategy must focus on enabling 
its rise, then, as Buzan and Cox argue, there are two broad options: warlike 
rise and peaceful rise.105 Warlike rise looks to the precedents set by most 
European powers and Japan, and rests on the realist expectation that the rising 
power will inevitably precipitate a great power war, and that all need to prepare 
for such a war. There is no sign that China wants, or is preparing for, a warlike 
rise, and as I have argued elsewhere,106 it would be irrational for it to do so. 
The conditions of global politics, most obviously nuclear deterrence, economic 
interdependence, and the illegitimacy of imperialism, rule out great power war 
as a rational option. The normative environment does not support great power 
wars, and the material risks and costs far outweigh any possible gains. We are 
no longer in the 1930s, when such wars were both still legitimate, and cost-
effective gambles in bids for superpower status. 
 If warlike rise is ruled out as a rational grand strategy option then only 
peaceful rise remains. With the realist criteria in mind, one might thus say that 
the minimum condition for peaceful rise is that a growing power is able to make 
both absolute and relative gains in both its material and its status positions, in 
relation to the other great powers in the international system without 
precipitating major hostilities between itself and other great powers. Peaceful 
rise involves a two-way process in which the rising power accommodates itself 
to the rules and structures of international society, while at the same time other 
great powers accommodate some changes in those rules and structures by 
way of adjusting to the new disposition of power and status. As Buzan and Cox 
also argued, there are few if any historical precedents for the peaceful rise of a 
great power, the US being the only other candidate, and then only in a qualified 
way.107 Historical comparisons and lessons are therefore few, necessitating a 
more theoretical approach to understanding peaceful rise.  
 All of the historical cases of warlike rise have involved hot wars and can 
more or less be seen as a single type. Peaceful rise, however, is more 
nuanced. The classical work of Galtung suggests a subdivision into two distinct 
types: negative peaceful rise (no direct use of force or great power war, but an 
environment of threat and suspicion; think of Israel and Egypt or Russia and 
the West); and positive peaceful rise (a friendly environment with a 
considerable depth of trust, and a low sense of threat: think of the EU, or US-
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Canada).108 Miller’s more recent work suggests a three, or possibly four, way 
subdivision using the following scheme: 
 High-level peace – is the equivalent of a security community in which the 
participants neither expect nor prepare for war against each other, and have 
mechanisms in place for peaceful change. 
 Normal peace – is like a strong security regime, when war is unlikely but not 
unimaginable, and most though not all conflict issues have been resolved. 
 Cold peace – is a weaker form of security regime, but still significant enough 
that states do not deploy military force in their relations with each other, 
even for diplomatic signalling, though they do prepare for war as a long term 
possibility.  
 Cold war – is on the boundary between warlike and peaceful rise. War is 
possible in the short term and states do use military instruments as part of 
their regular diplomatic relations.109  
 Negative peace in Galtung’s scheme roughly equates with Miller’s cold 
war, while his positive peace roughly equates to Miller’s high-level peace. Miller 
is correct in suggesting the need for something between these two extremes, 
but in my view not very convincing in his differentiation between normal peace 
and cold peace, where the boundary is very hazy, and even for cold peace the 
criteria are extremely demanding in relation to military restraint. In relation to 
thinking about peaceful rise, I will therefore use three general models, which, 
sticking with Miller’s temperature metaphor, I will label hot, warm and cold 
peaceful rise.  
 A hot peaceful rise (HPR) would be conducted in the terms of the behaviour 
appropriate to a security community, and aim for that as an outcome. While 
theoretically possible, and perhaps desirable, this would be an extremely 
demanding form of peaceful rise and perhaps therefore not a very likely one 
except in the longer term. 
 A warm peaceful rise (WPR) would be conducted in terms of the behaviour 
appropriate to a security regime and aim for that outcome.110 A security 
regime is a pattern of security interdependence still shaped by fear of war 
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and expectations of violence in political relations, but where those fears and 
expectations are restrained by agreed sets of rules of conduct, and 
expectation that those rules will be observed. This obviously covers a 
spectrum of possibilities stretching between the two extremes from quite 
warm to tepid. 
 A cold peaceful rise (CPR) would be conducted in raw power political terms 
using threat and intimidation, but avoiding hot war. In some ways this would 
be close to traditional warlike rise: exercising power to force change, but 
relying on the all-round fear of great power war to act as a restraint.  
 
 As shown above, China’s foreign policy rhetoric and behaviour stretch 
awkwardly across these three models. On the one hand, with its talk of 
harmony and co-development, and of itself as a status quo power, and its 
practices of joining intergovernmental arrangements, and contributing to 
peacekeeping operations, China leans towards WPR or even, especially in 
some of its rhetoric, HPR. On the other hand with its talk of nationalism, 
victimhood, and the rights of the big over the small, and its practices of 
assertive military pursuit of territorial claims and gagging of its own civil society, 
China leans towards CPR. China’s military development has been relatively 
modest for a country of its size,111 and despite all the foreign fuss about its 
aircraft carriers and missiles does not yet point decisively in either direction. 
This seemingly incoherent, or at best drifting, strategy nevertheless points 
firmly towards an outcome of tepid WPR or CPR. Given such a mixed picture, 
the rational response of China’s neighbours and other great powers is a realist 
one of prudence: seeking to engage China peacefully where possible, while 
hedging against its rising power in case things turn nasty. On this reasoning, if 
China carries on with its current lines of rhetoric and behaviour, it will de facto 
have opted for a policy of tepid WPR or CPR.  
 Since CPR, WPR and HPR represent quite different grand strategies, 
and since China’s leaders do not yet seem to have made up their mind which 
they wants to pursue, it is worth looking more closely at the rhetorical and 
behavioural requirements for each of them. If China’s seven core aims 
identified above remain relatively constant, by what means can they best be 
pursued? This exercise assumes that China’s absolute and relative capabilities 
will continue to rise. It focuses on contradictions amongst the ends, and 
between ends and means, with a view to highlighting how these might be 
differently handled within the three models, or if not handled, what the 
consequences would be. 
 
Cold Peaceful Rise 
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 If China chooses CPR then it can just carry on with its present mixed 
policy of drift, or even somewhat intensify the more assertive line it has taken 
since 2008. Either choice would quickly reveal that the whole PRD rhetoric 
from Deng onward in China was and is simply propaganda: a transitional 
strategy to cover a period of weakness until China became strong enough to 
assert itself in power terms. It would vindicate those realists who always 
suspected that PRD was a Sun Tze style Art of War strategic deception, and 
that as China grew stronger it would become more assertive.112 A choice for 
CPR by either route thus declares openly that from here on in China thinks 
itself strong enough to play a straightforward game of power politics. Because 
the constraints on great power war are high all round, the risk is small that even 
a measured increase in Chinese assertiveness will escalate into de facto 
warlike rise. Going with CPR would enable China to focus on hard power 
means, where it will be increasingly strong, while not worrying too much about 
soft power ones, where high levels of state control make it much less 
competitive. But a choice for CPR would mean that some contradictions 
amongst China’s ends, and also between its ends and means, would either 
remain or intensify. 
 There is no obvious, immediate, contradiction between CPR and China’s 
first five ends: maintaining the exclusive rule of the communist party; 
maintaining high economic growth; maintaining the stability of Chinese society; 
defending the country’s territorial integrity, including reunification and territorial 
disputes; and increasing China’s national power relative to the US, other great 
powers and China’s neighbours, and achieving a more multipolar, less US-
dominated, world order. There is a very obvious contradiction between CPR 
and the aim of avoiding others perceiving China as threatening. Under CPR 
this aim would have to be abandoned because the contradiction is 
unresolvable. A China determined to play a game of power politics on the 
strength of its rising hard power simply cannot avoid looking threatening to 
others. China’s much commented upon bigness matters crucially here. 
Because the country is so immense, a strategy based mainly on its rising hard 
power will alarm everyone. It will most likely trigger balancing realist responses 
in the form of some combination of alignment, alliance and self-strengthening, 
though some bandwagoning cannot be ruled out. 
 The sixth aim – maintaining favourable regional and global conditions for 
China’s development – is the tricky one because of the two ways of pursuing it. 
‘Favourable conditions’ defined as favourable to China with no regard to how 
others feel about it, would be compatible with CPR, and open the door to the 
creation of such conditions by power political means and the pursuit of Chinese 
primacy within the region. Such a move would certainly intensify ‘China threat’ 
dynamics. It would also require China to abandon its anti-hegemonism rhetoric, 
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or if not, put itself in the invidious and hypocritical position of arguing for anti-
hegemonism at the global level while pursuing what most outsiders and others 
within East Asia would perceive as hegemonism at the regional one. Securing 
a ‘favourable environment’ by such power political means might work up to a 
point, but it risks reaction and instability. If it backfires, this strategy could feed 
back negatively into economic growth, and eventually into the legitimacy of 
CCP rule, by making others hesitant to strengthen Chinese power through 
trade and investment. If ‘favourable conditions’ is defined as ‘favourable to all 
concerned’, then this points to WPR or HPR and will be discussed below.  
 Because of its mixed behaviour and policy of drift, China already has 
some track record of CPR, especially so since its assertive turn in foreign 
policy after 2008. China’s relations with the US as the prevailing hegemon are 
mainly lukewarm or cold peace, as are its relations with two of its major power 
neighbours, Japan and India. China’s strategic partnership with Russia is 
instrumental (shared anti-Western views, a temporary need to stand back-to-
back) rather than warm, and remains fundamentally shallow and fragile.113 Its 
political relations with Europe are thin apart from trade, and politically more 
about indifference than either cold or warm. China’s relations with its smaller 
neighbours have been mixed. Up until 2008, there was a slow but quite steady 
trend towards warming relations with Southeast Asia. But since then China has 
taken a more aggressive line, pushing most of its relations with Southeast Asia 
into the tepid WPR or CPR models.  
 There is a substantial academic view that China has reaped mainly 
negative international consequences from its assertive nationalism towards its 
neighbours. Hughes sees negative outcomes for China when the nationalist 
line has prevailed, whether over Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang, social 
stability in China, or China’s ability to operate within the global economy.114 
Zhang sees negative outcomes for China when it resorted to aggressive 
behaviour in the South China Sea and Taiwan during the mid-1990s.115 Others 
see the new assertiveness since 2008 as alienating China’s neighbours in 
Southeast Asia and reversing its diplomatic gains there from the 1990s.116 
Womack sees a danger that China will replicate the mistake of the USSR and 
achieve self-containment by alienating its neighbours.117 Several Chinese 
analysts agree that the assertive turn after 2008 has had mostly negative 
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consequences for China.118 China’s recent resort to gunboat diplomacy over 
the Daioyu/Senkaku dispute with Japan helped a more nationalist, right-wing 
Abe government to get elected there, and legitimises both stronger ties 
between Japan and the US, and Japan’s moves towards military self-
strengthening. From a hard strategic calculus point of view, it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that China’s CPR moves are mainly advantageous to the US, 
legitimising its position in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, and 
motivating many of China’s neighbours to hedge by moving closer to each 
other and the US. There are indications that even Russia and Japan are putting 
aside their differences to hedge against China.119 Very predictably, as Womack 
says, the CPR side of China’s behaviour is uniting its neighbours in fear of it. 
 To sum up, going for a grand strategy of CPR would have the following 
consequences. It would make unviable the end of avoiding having China 
appear threatening to others, though this might not matter if PRD was anyway 
just a deception strategy. In that case, concern about ‘China threat’ was not 
really a core aim, but just a temporary instrumental tactic no longer compatible 
with the exercise of China’s new power. This shift in China’s aims would 
encourage hedging and balancing against China in Asia, which in turn would, 
as it is already doing, strengthen the US position in East and South Asia. 
Within China, these foreign reactions would very likely reinforce the culture of 
ultra-nationalism and looking backward to a history of victimhood and 
exploitation by outsiders. The CCP leadership might see that as a positive gain 
to the extent that its own tenure was thereby underpinned, and its inclination to 
curtail Chinese civil society made easier to implement. The risk would be of 
run-away negative security spirals strong enough to threaten both sustained 
economic growth and the pursuit of favourable regional and global conditions 
for China’s development. Negative security spirals would also trigger regional 
military responses to China’s own increasing military strength, a process 
already visible.120 China’s size and capabilities would probably allow it to retain 
a military edge over its neighbours, but it would have to spend a lot more to do 
so, and if handed such a strategic gift, the US would doubtless be glad to sell 
balancing weaponry to China’s neighbours, and to use their fear of China to its 
own ends. China does not have the option, as the US did, of insulating its 
region from outside powers, and then dominating it.  
 
Warm Peaceful Rise 
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 If China chooses WPR then it has a much more demanding, but also 
potentially much more rewarding, task before it. China would need to conduct 
its foreign and security policy in a much more strategically focused and 
coordinated way than it has done in recent years. WPR requires deploying 
China’s increasing means in ways that reduce the contradictions among its 
ends. It would require a consensual approach to maintaining favourable 
regional and global conditions for China’s development, and it would mean that 
all seven of China’s core aims, including avoiding having others perceive China 
as threatening, could be pursued simultaneously. It would mean making 
‘favourable’ and ‘harmonious’ relations a meaningful two-way street, and not 
just a product of hierarchical relations projected by China. As noted above, 
WPR addresses the difficult problem for China of how to increase its power 
without creating insecurities and fears among its neighbours and/or the other 
great powers. WPR as a grand strategy has to deliver on China’s seven aims 
while at the same time enabling China to increase its absolute and relative 
capabilities within international society. If it can do this, WPR is a potential 
grand strategy for the long haul, not just a transitional tactic to cover a period of 
weakness. It rests on the assumption that Deng’s analysis of international 
relations from 1978 remains fundamentally valid: i.e. that peace and 
development have become the main characteristics of international society;121 
that China is no longer existentially threatened by other great powers; and that 
China’s own development depends on it being engaged with the world 
economy. These do indeed remain valid. The main change since 1978 is that 
China is now strong and very consequential in international society, whereas 
then it was weak and relatively inconsequential.  
 There is no doubt that China can do WPR if it wants to. As Ren argues, it 
did so quite successfully in relation to Southeast Asian and global IGOs during 
the 1990s and the first few years of the 2000s.122 There is also no doubt that 
international society remains quite benign towards China’s rise and would be 
more so if that rise was conducted as a warm one. As Payne observes, 
‘security is now more frequently believed to be indivisible’, and cooperative 
security is embedded in the security strategies of the OSCE and the EU.123 
There is a rising sense of shared threats and shared fates, whether to do with 
economic (in)stability, WMD proliferation, internet security, terrorism, climate 
change, and/or global diseases. A key underpinning of responsible great power 
behaviour is therefore the recognition of common problems that require 
collective action because they generate shared fates. Shared fates amplify the 
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necessity to give priority to raison de système over raison d’etat, and require a 
turn towards the principle of common or cooperative security: security ‘with’ 
rather than security ‘against’.124 In the absence of threats of either great power 
war, or any great power striving to replace the US as sole superpower, and 
without any commanding ideological differences about ‘market economy or 
not’, the national security agenda no longer has the stark existential quality that 
it traditionally held. Security ‘with’ is now more important, and increasingly more 
obvious, than security ‘against’. There is a resource within the region that might 
facilitate building WPR along these lines: the fact that most countries within 
East Asia have similar views about comprehensive security, embodying the 
logic of security across cultural, societal, political, environmental as well as 
military sectors.125 
 There is not much intrinsic opposition to China’s rise, which is widely 
seen as not only inevitable; but in terms of the norms of international society 
also justified, and in many ways welcome. China’s rather self-serving rhetoric 
about how its own development will benefit everyone else is not wrong, and at 
least in economic terms is widely appreciated. The more locomotives pulling 
the global economy along, the better. That rising powers should get a bigger 
role and a higher status in international society is also an acknowledged trend 
of the times, as visible in the shift from the G8 to the G20. China’s rise is not an 
isolated phenomenon but part of the ‘rise of the rest’,126 and a more decentred, 
pluralist, global order with a more diffuse distribution of power,127 and a 
narrower ideological bandwidth.128 Except for hard realists, whose theory 
excludes the possibility of peaceful rise by definition, China’s rise is not itself a 
problem: reactions to it depend mainly on whether it will be conducted in WPR 
or CPR mode. 
 To address the eight policy dilemmas sketched above a WPR strategy 
would need to work simultaneously on three levels: domestic, regional, and 
global. The most basic point about a grand strategy of WPR is that it would 
require China to have confidence that the natural rise in its power, when 
combined with a benign face, would achieve its main aims more effectively and 
more efficiently that a CPR strategy. It is widely accepted that nothing is going 
to stop China’s rise, and therefore that international society has to 
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accommodate increases in its status and influence. Making the necessary 
accommodations will be much easier the more that the rest of world sees 
China as benign and stable, and this is the basis of the virtuous cycle – in 
contrast to the negative security spiral that accompanies CPR – on which the 
strategy of WPR rests. What would China have to do in order to rise in a warm 
peaceful way? 
 
Domestic 
 
 Because regime security is one of China’s core aims, there is a close link 
between its domestic, and foreign and security policies. Like all the other great 
powers, China is playing the market game, but unlike most of them it is not a 
democracy. Its commitment to one-party rule means that it cannot even play 
the Russian strategy of pretending to be democratic while in fact being 
authoritarian. This political outlier status is part of China’s security problem. 
Unlike the US, China cannot easily make a plausible claim either that its 
domestic political structure necessarily makes it a peaceable player in 
international society; or that outsiders can with high reliability both know what 
China stands for and safely assume that its internal structure will have a high 
continuity over the coming decades. Even with a strong defence of non-
intervention, China cannot avoid that how it conducts its internal affairs affects 
the kind of image it projects abroad. A strategy of WPR can address this 
apparent contradiction between regime security and how others see China in 
three ways. 
  First, if the CCP is to remain in power permanently, then it must openly 
and credibly commit itself to continue to evolve, as it has been doing ever since 
the reform and opening up began. Reform of the Party needs to keep pace with 
the social market society that its successful economic reform is generating, and 
this may require radical changes equivalent to those made in the late 70s and 
early 80s. The transformation in China over the last thirty years has been both 
deep and impressive, and there is some risk that the Party is not keeping up 
with the society it has created. Having made ‘market communism’ work, the 
CCP next needs to invent what might be called ‘pluralist communism’, in which, 
within the context of one-party rule, the diversity of civil society is allowed more 
voice on issues such as the environment, education, corruption, justice and 
social policy. Complex modern societies like China now is, need feedback and 
debate if they are to manage their evolution effectively, and benefit from the 
expanding resource of educated citizens that they have created. Alongside this, 
the CCP needs to find the confidence to make its legitimacy forward-looking, as 
any communist party should do. It needs to roll back the strategy begun in the 
1990s of reinforcing its own legitimacy by promoting patriotic education and a 
backward-looking Chinese nationalism rooted in the century of humiliation and 
hatred of Japan and the US. This strategy is both unnecessary, and inevitably 
corrosive of WPR on the regional and global levels. Instead, the CCP needs to 
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root its legitimacy in the progressive unfolding of a pluralist social market 
society; the continued management of China’s successful development policy; 
and the restoration of China’s status and power in international society. 
Nationalism can be re-based around the ample resources of both China’s 
classical past and its present achievements. The widespread desire amongst 
Chinese to avoid any return to political fragmentation provides a firm foundation 
for both moves. 
 Second, and as part of the move to ‘pluralist communism’, China needs 
to cultivate a more laid back and relaxed approach to the domestic side of its 
territorial integrity aims. China’s position here is quite complicated, because the 
country is still in the long historic transition process from being an empire to 
being a state. Although there are many minor border disputes, there are no 
serious general challenges to China’s existing land borders, and since China is 
not a democracy the peoples within it have no constitutional right of secession. 
Tibet and Xinjiang are therefore mainly image problems for China. Nobody is 
going to tear them away from China, and China is not going to let them go, but 
how they are handled by China matters to how outsiders interpret the nature of 
China’s rising power. Harsh repression and large scale settlement by Han 
Chinese play badly abroad by making China’s behaviour look imperialist. There 
are practical policy options around multiculturalism from many countries for 
dealing with minority peoples, and respecting cultural difference, while not 
bringing into question the sovereignty of the state. These provide a resource 
from which China might learn.  
 Taiwan is even more complicated, because while China sees it as a 
purely domestic issue, much of the rest of the world reads it as at least partly 
an international one even while acknowledging ‘one China’. On the 
international side, Taiwan’s status as a democracy matters here, while on the 
domestic side the deep commitment of the CCP to completing the revolutionary 
unification of China is also a complicating factor. Heath notes 2020 and 2050 
as dates where the CCP has committed itself to deliver on some key 
objectives, and if these commitments are taken seriously, they could easily 
generate real problems between China, its neighbours and the US, particularly 
over Taiwan.129 Again, there is no question about the ends, but a big one about 
the means, and how they affect China’s image. Bullying and threats make 
China look imperialist. China needs to look to its legendary ability to play the 
long game, and have the confidence that its own market and pluralist evolution, 
along with ever-deeper economic integration will steadily, naturally and 
peacefully close the gap across the Straits. The Taiwan problem will be much 
more effectively, cheaply, and impressively solved by seduction than by 
coercion. 
 Thirdly, China needs to give priority to constructing a more coherent and 
controlled foreign policy process. Things have drifted because the Central 
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Committee has had too little interest in foreign policy, and the foreign ministry 
has been weak, divided and remote from the centre of power. This contrasts 
with other great powers, where the foreign minister is usually one of the central 
figures in the government. The military, fishing industry, oil industry, various 
maritime agencies, provincial governments, and other local actors have had too 
much autonomy in making China’s foreign policy. There is a serious need for 
China to get better control over its foreign policy making process, reigning in 
the plethora of uncoordinated agencies.130 The effect of this fragmentation has 
been to make China’s foreign and security policy look inconsistent, incoherent 
and unreliable. If it is to avoid being seen as strategic deception, WPR 
demands a high level of coherence and consistency in the deployment of 
means, especially so at the regional level. A more coherently managed foreign 
and security policy would reassure others about China’s reliability as a 
diplomatic player. Given its commanding position and longevity in office, the 
CCP should be well placed to deliver such coherence, though in practice so far 
it has not.131 
 
Regional 
 
 The regional level is the most crucial one for China’s PRD strategy for it 
is there that the choice between CPR and WPR will largely be made. As noted 
above, China does not have the option that the US did of easily dominating its 
neighbours and keeping its relationships with them separate from its relations 
with other great powers.132 Many of China’s neighbours are substantial rising 
powers in their own right, and even a declining US will be a major presence in 
the region for a long time. The key to WPR at the regional level is thus that 
China has to be nice to its neighbours in a sustained way, using its power not 
to intimidate them into submission, but to build relationships of trust with them. 
Germany, Indonesia and Brazil all provide lessons about how a big power can 
pursue WPR in its region; Russia, Israel and India provide lessons about the 
costs of not doing so. It is on this level that the WPR strategy requires China to 
have confidence that the natural rise in its power, when combined with a 
benign face, will achieve its main aims more effectively and more efficiently that 
a CPR strategy. Within Asia, China has the most to gain from WPR and the 
most to lose from CPR. And unfair though it may be, because China is the big 
rising power that others fear, it has to to take the lead for WPR, and bear the 
biggest burden in making it work. How other countries react to such initiatives 
of course matters: it takes two to tango. But given the extent to which 
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international relations within East Asia have slipped towards CPR, there may 
be a lot of work to do. Sceptical partners may need to be asked many times 
before they agree to dance, so in pursuing WPR China need to be patient, 
persistent, and to play the long game. Reacting to short-term rebuffs in a tit-for-
tat way, as hard-minded nationalists will demand, would simply revert to the 
existing track towards CPR. Expecting others in the region to take the lead for 
WPR when it is China that is growing strong is simply unrealistic. As Womack 
observes, because hegemony is mainly in the eye of the beholder, China 
needs to devote a lot of effort to reassurance to prevent self-containment in its 
region.133 It is in this challenging form that the maxim ‘with great power comes 
great responsibility’, faces China today. If China does not take the lead for 
WPR nobody else will.  
 There are three problems for China, and indeed for the region, in 
implementing WPR: the malign role that history plays in East Asian regional 
politics; the existence of border disputes; and the ambiguity both in China and 
amongst its neighbours about whether domination of the region is one of 
China’s aims. None of these will be easily or quickly solved, especially not after 
the escalations of the past few years have poisoned the atmosphere. 
Addressing them will require commitment to consistent behaviour over a long 
period, and the sooner this begins, the better. It is well understood that it takes 
a long time to build relations of trust and only moments to destroy them. A 
strategy along these lines should play to China’s strengths and skills in 
relationalism.134  
 To address the history problem, as already noted, China needs to define 
and promote its own patriotism and nationalism in ways that do not place anti-
Japanese historical memories at its core. While the facts of history are a 
narrow technical matter governed by academic rules, how history is interpreted 
and reinterpreted is always a political choice. China made such a choice in the 
early 1990s,135 and it needs to revisit this. China certainly has enough splendid 
history of its own, and splendid prospects of re-emergence to look forward to, 
to provide ample resources for a more positive nationalism, that does not 
depend on looking back to the century of humiliation. It is possible, though 
politically difficult, to tell East Asian history over the last two centuries in a way 
that does justice to the facts, but would be neutral, or even ameliorative, in 
relation to contemporary politics.136 All of the countries in Northeast Asia can 
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claim part of the credit for the way in which the region has both freed itself from 
Western domination and become rich and powerful; and all deserve part of the 
blame for its humanitarian disasters and poisonous political relations. This 
balance sheet, and the Western role on both sides of it, needs to be drawn up, 
put on the table, and made a core part of WPR strategy. Europe offers some 
lessons on this. It is clear that Japan is incapable of taking the lead, and is 
indeed part of the problem to be solved.137 So China needs to take the lead, 
confronting its own past in the process, and collaborating with its East Asian 
neighbours to produce a consensual history of the region on which to re-base 
the current relations of East Asia’s states and peoples with each other. Putting 
the past into a shared perspective, in which all get due credit and blame, is a 
necessary condition for looking forward together in terms of common interests 
rather than looking backward to what once divided them. 
 To address the border disputes problem, China needs to turn sharply 
away from its present policy of dismissing the claims of other states, asserting 
its own claims unilaterally, and resorting to gunboat diplomacy. Perhaps more 
than anything else these tactics are pushing China towards a CPR outcome, 
and rather like the US, China seems to be drifting towards a policy in which 
military options are its default first choice when problems arise in its 
international relations. This policy needs to be reconsidered, and brought under 
strict central control. Under a WPR strategy, military means should be the 
absolute last resort: available if necessary, but used seldom, preferably never. 
China has a good record in pursuing a relatively restrained program of military 
modernization, and this should be continued. China needs to balance its 
security and symbolic needs for military capability with the need to avoid 
making its neighbours feel militarily threatened. Military restraint needs to be 
accompanied first by acknowledgment that disputes exist and are genuine. 
Most of the border issues in Asia have such long, murky and complicated 
histories that self-righteous unilateral claims by either side look both 
provocative and implausible. Second, it needs to be accompanied by sustained 
willingness to promote and commit to peaceful means for the resolution of 
territorial and other disputes. China should seize the moral high ground by 
declaring its willingness to submit all territorial disputes to international 
arbitration and to abide by the results. Its failure so far to do so makes it 
vulnerable, as the Philippines has shown, to others seizing the moral high 
ground and putting China on the back foot. If the existing machineries for such 
arbitration are thought to lack sufficient objectivity, then China should offer to 
collaborate with its neighbours in creating machineries that they all trust. In an 
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economically open world, nothing is at stake in these border disputes that is 
anything like as valuable as the political and societal relationships of trust 
within the region that are being destroyed by pursuit of them. 
 To accompany this turn to dispute settlement, China should offer 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) and the machinery of a security regime 
to neighbours and to the US: protocols for avoiding incidents both air and 
naval; transparency about military budgets and exercises; regularized high-
level military meetings and exchanges; and suchlike. Again there is an 
opportunity here for China to seize the moral high ground. More widely as part 
of this charm offensive, China should resume a positive engagement with 
ASEAN and its offshoots, and rebuild relationships with Japan, South Korea 
and India. It should stop opposing Japan’s and India’s bids for UNSC 
membership. These powers have reasonable claims to a seat at the top tables 
of global management. China’s opposition to them both contradicts its frequent 
declarations about favouring a multipolar international order, and makes China 
look like it is playing a hypocritical and hegemonic game.  
 If the history and border disputes problems were addressed in this way, 
then the regional hegemony problem would largely disappear. All that would 
remain is for China to be clear in its rhetoric that it did not seek to dominate the 
region, and was prepared to bind its power, as the US did so successfully after 
1945, in regional institutional arrangements.  
 One payoff for China in doing this would be the construction of a 
favourable regional environment for its development that would be much more 
stable and easy to maintain than one imposed by fear and coercion. Within 
such a consensual region China’s naturally greater weight would deliver on its 
aims at low cost and low risk. Another, equally significant, payoff would be to 
reduce US influence and legitimacy in East and South Asia by minimising 
threat perceptions of China amongst its neighbours. The US is far from being 
unequivocably loved in East and South Asia. Much of the legitimacy of its 
presence there rests on the fact that the local states need its presence to offset 
their fear of Chinese power. In the modern world China will never be able to 
restore the civilizational centrality it enjoyed in East Asia during classical times. 
But it does have the option to live up to its rhetorics of peace, harmony and 
multipolarity by minimizing threat perception of it amongst its neighbours, and 
cultivating their shared commitment to a politics of relationalism rooted in their 
shared culture. Care would need to be taken to distance relationalism and 
harmony from their classical association with hierarchical relations organized 
around the central kingdom. By so doing China could weaken the US position 
in the Western Pacific in an entirely risk-free way. 
 
Global 
 
 Because of the strong links between the regional and global levels in 
Asia, if China can succeed with WPR in its region, then it would have gone a 
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long way towards successful WPR amongst the great powers generally and the 
US in particular. This is particularly true of its relationship with Japan. As 
argued above, WPR with Japan will be particularly difficult: on past record, the 
Japanese are unlikely to be helpful, and China will have to make changes to its 
own telling of history. But as I have argued elsewhere, Japan is absolutely 
crucial to China’s PRD because of its major roles both at the regional level 
(where Japan is the other great power) and at the global level (where it is the 
key to the US position in the Western Pacific, and more arguably also to the 
global superpower standing of the US).138 This is another reason for China to 
support Japan’s and India’s bids for place on the UNSC, and more generally to 
acknowledge the rise of the rest both within its region and in the rest of the 
world. China cannot coherently both call for a more multipolar world and then 
stand in the way of other ‘poles’ being given their due status. Great power 
relations in a world of decentred globalism will not be about system dominance, 
because none will be in a position to do so, and like China now, probably none 
will aspire to the thankless and expensive job. It will be about the great powers 
managing their collective shared fates in relation to the global economy, the 
proliferation of WMD, terrorism, the environment and suchlike. China needs to 
position itself for this world, not start playing an obsolete game of great power 
one-upmanship.  
 That said the pursuit of WPR does have implications for China’s 
relationship with the US. That relationship has so far been reasonably well 
managed inasmuch as both sides are highly conscious that neither wants a war 
with the other, and both take some care to avoid letting the tensions between 
them go too far. Yet the overall relation between them is more cold than warm, 
and since both are quite strongly driven by realist thinking there is a significant 
danger that their mutual realism will generate a self-fulfilling prophecy. If both 
believe that they are playing a traditional power transition game, then there is a 
serious risk that their cold relationship could become more rivalry than 
coexistence. As I have argued, a successful WPR strategy by China in Asia 
would have negative implications for the US position there. While the US can 
hardly complain about China being nice to its neighbours, it might still feel 
threatened by that process. As Turner argues, there are longstanding threat 
perceptions of China in the US that are easy to play to by constructing China’s 
rise as a threat to the US’s identity as the sole superpower.139 Along this line, 
Johnston’s observation of how flawed characterizations of China within the US 
media since 2010 might play adversely into US/China relations by creating self-
fulfilling prophecies, is a case in point.140 In principle, the US could pursue a 
highly accommodative strategy, tolerating CPR behaviour by China. In practice, 
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the relationship between the two is sufficiently edgy to make this highly 
unlikely. While as Buzan and Cox have argued,141 the US has been quite 
accommodative of China’s peaceful rise, there is no evidence to suggest that it 
would acquiesce in an aggressive CPR by China, which would make the US 
look weak if it did not respond. Even if the US and China did follow such a path, 
the outcome would not be warm either in the region or at the global level. 
 One aim of a WPR strategy is to prevent such an outcome, and here too 
China has the opportunity to seize the moral high ground by offering CBMs to 
the US. CPR makes raising China’s costs an easy game for the US to play. At 
the very least, a sustained and determined WPR strategy by China in Asia, and 
towards the US, would make it difficult for the US to raise China’s costs by 
supporting containment strategies in Asia. Joint projects such as in space 
science would also contribute to the global level of WPR, although whether the 
US can overcome its suspicions sufficiently to allow this remains to be seen. If 
it cannot, then China should seek space cooperation, and build trust, with other 
powers until the US come around. Again, this will require patience, tolerance 
and a willingness to play the long game. Some part of the realist problem 
between the US and China is probably ineradicable, but assiduous pursuit of 
WPR by China would make sure that the chance of this becoming the dominant 
view within the US would be minimized. China’s regional WPR would thus also 
underpin the creation of a favourable environment for its development at the 
global level. 
 A key point about all this is its low risk to China. If WPR works, the gains 
would be very large. But if it doesn’t – i.e. if after many years others fail to 
respond to a sustained and coherent Chinese turn to WPR – then China is 
simply back where it is now, except stronger, and occupying the moral high 
ground. 
 
Hot Peaceful Rise 
 
 Given the difficulties of pursuing WPR, HPR is hardly a realistic option at 
this point. Many things would have to change before Asia could become a 
security community – and not just in China. That said, HPR is compatible with 
all of China’s aims, though like WPR it would require a softer line on territorial 
integrity where that involves border disputes with others, and even more than 
WPR, a considerable relaxation in the CCP’s control over China’s civil society. 
While HPR might at this point seem utopian and unrealistic for China, it is 
nevertheless the case that quite a bit of Chinese foreign policy rhetoric is 
phrased in HPR terms. The 2011 statement on ‘China’s Peaceful Development’ 
is almost a model statement of HPR.142 Consider the following excerpts: 
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‘China will not engage in arms race with any other country, and it does 
not pose a military threat to any other country. China follows the principle 
of not attacking others unless it is attacked, and it is committed to solving 
international disputes and hotspot issues with peaceful means.’ (Part 2) 
 
‘We will continue to conduct democratic election, decision-making, 
governance and supervision in accordance with the law, uphold people's 
right to have access to information, to participate in governance, to 
express their views and to supervise the government, and we will expand 
orderly public participation in the political process. We will continue to 
treat all ethnic groups as equals and practice the system of regional 
autonomy of ethnic minorities, protect people's freedom of religious belief 
according to law, and fully respect and uphold basic human rights and 
other lawful rights and interests of citizens.’ (Part 2) 
 
‘China…. is opposed to the practices of the big bullying the small and the 
strong oppressing the weak, and to hegemonism and power politics. 
China calls for settling disputes and conflicts through talks and 
consultation and by seeking common ground while putting aside 
differences.’ (Part 2) 
 
 ‘China actively enhances friendly cooperation with its neighbors and 
works with them to promote a harmonious Asia. China calls on countries 
in the region to respect each other, increase mutual trust, seek common 
ground while putting aside differences, safeguard regional peace and 
stability, and settle disputes including those over territorial claims and 
maritime rights and interests through dialogue and friendly negotiation. 
Countries should increase trade and mutually beneficial cooperation, 
promote regional economic integration, improve the current regional and 
sub-regional cooperative mechanisms, be open-minded to other 
proposals for regional cooperation, and welcome countries outside the 
region to play a constructive role in promoting regional peace and 
development. China does not seek regional hegemony or sphere of 
influence, nor does it want to exclude any country from participating in 
regional cooperation…. It will remain a good neighbor, friend and partner 
of other Asian countries.’ (Part 3) 
 
‘The international community should reject the zero-sum game which was 
a product of the old international relations, the dangerous cold and hot 
war mentality, and all those beaten tracks which repeatedly led mankind 
to confrontation and war. It should find new perspectives from the angle 
of the community of common destiny, sharing weal and woe and 
pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation, exploring new ways to enhance 
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exchanges and mutual learning among different civilizations, identifying 
new dimensions in the common interests and values of mankind, and 
looking for new ways to handle multiple challenges through cooperation 
among countries and realize inclusive development. We want peace and 
not war, development and not stagnation; dialogue and not confrontation; 
understanding and not misunderstanding. This is the general trend of the 
world and the common aspiration of all people.’ (Part 4) 
 
 Such lofty aspirational statements might be dismissed as mere 
propaganda, harmless or possibly even helpful to WPR. But ironically, they are 
actually damaging to WPR. Even outside observers sympathetic to China 
cannot fail to notice the rather wide gap documented in previous pages 
between such aspirations and China’s actual domestic and foreign policy 
practices. Those less sympathetic will simply read them as cynical and 
hypocritical attempts at strategic deception, and take them as evidence to 
support robust balancing responses to China’s rise. If China’s practices cannot 
be made to live up to this rhetoric, then the rhetoric needs to be brought more 
into line with practice. China’s international propaganda under Mao was at least 
clear, honest and straightforward. It did not shrink from specifying a politics of 
struggle against capitalism and the West, and was pretty much in line with 
China’s behaviour. Today’s propaganda is neither honest, nor coherent with 
China’s behaviour. If China wants to pursue WPR, it needs to moderate its 
overblown rhetoric of HPR to reduce the contradictions and inconsistencies 
between what it says and what it does. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 The basic question at stake here is what kind of great power China wants 
to be: one that claims its place in international society mainly by power political, 
CPR means or mainly by consensual, WPR ones. As shown above, both 
strategies are broadly compatible with China’s main aims in its foreign and 
security policy, though they have very different implications for how it is done 
and what problems and contradictions arise. The choice is whether China want 
to use its rising power to look forward, and help create a more pluralist, 
decentred international society in the post-Western age, or look backward, 
seeking vengeance for the century of humiliation and to restore a Sino-centric 
system in East Asia. If China isn’t existentially threatened militarily it doesn’t 
need to be militarily assertive, and can gain status and legitimacy both from its 
increasing weight, and from being self-restrained in this way.  
 Grand strategies can be assessed by four standards: cost, risk, 
probability of success, and morality, although the last is tricky given the lack of 
accepted universal standards for judging it. On the basis of the arguments 
given here, and leaving out HPR as unrealistic for the time being, one might 
posit the following assessments for CPR and WPR. 
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 In terms of cost, CPR would be high in military expenditure resulting from 
threat perceptions and action-reaction dynamics; high in political costs of 
opposition to China; and possibly high in economic costs if fear of China 
became sufficient to affect trade and investment. The costs of WPR would 
be considerably less in all of these respects, but there would be significant 
domestic political costs associated with some U-turns on current policy. 
 In terms of risk, CPR would be high in confrontations, alienating neighbours, 
and reinforcing the US position in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. 
WPR would be low risk, because the US could not oppose it either 
regionally or globally, and the natural extension of China’s power and 
influence would happen anyway. Even if others did not reciprocate China’s 
WPR for a long time, though country would not be weakened or threatened 
by having taken this path. 
 In terms of probability of success, CPR ranks high because its conditions 
are undemanding and present trends point to it. The question is not whether 
it can be done, but whether or not it is a good idea to take this path. By 
contrast, WPR is difficult to do, and would certainly take a long time to 
deliver fully on its potential. It would have been easier to begin it before the 
2008 turn towards a harder foreign policy line. Time is perhaps now running 
out with Japan and parts of ASEAN where the downward security spiral with 
China is serious, and if pursued much further could delay the possibility of 
repairing relations for a generation or more. There is a real risk that the 
continued pursuit of current policy will foreclose the option of WPR. 
 In terms of morality, CPR takes the moral low ground internationally, though 
the backward looking militant nationalists in China might construct it morally 
as justified payback for the century of humiliation. WPR gives China several 
options to take the moral high ground internationally, but might be difficult to 
sell domestically given the way present Chinese nationalism has been 
constructed around victimhood and anti-Japanese sentiment. 
 With the alternatives of CPR and WPR in mind, China needs to think very 
carefully about the self-fulfilling prophecy aspect of realism. If it does not do 
more to put itself into the shoes of others in anticipating responses to its own 
power and behaviour, then the consequence will be CPR. The present (and 
traditional) mix of soft and hard foreign policy rhetoric and behaviour will not 
work for WPR. There is plenty of evidence that Deng’s view that the nature of 
the international system had changed towards a low risk of great power war, 
and open opportunities for co-development, remain both correct, and influential 
in China. Yet there is also plenty of evidence that Zhang’s point about China 
thinking of itself as living in a realist, Hobbesian world also remains 
influential.143 China cannot have a coherent grand strategy until its leaders 
commit to one or the other of these views. History will judge harshly a 
leadership whose rhetoric raised hopes of WPR, or even HPR, but whose 
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performance delivered CPR. Peaceful rise/development is a unique idea for 
China’s grand strategy. A leadership that delivered it as WPR could claim a 
truly historic accomplishment that would mark the end of the Western 
dominated era of warlike rise, and the move to a new model of international 
relations. It would have delivered on its own stated aspiration that: ‘The 
international community…. should find new perspectives from the angle of the 
community of common destiny’.144 
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